Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian Americans in a Society Obsessed with O.J.

The Lee article made me think a lot about my own heritage. As a half-Caucasian, quarter-Chinese, quarter-Pacific Islander (Guamanian, or Chamorro), I am sometimes recognized as having an "ethnic" look about me. On one job interview for an inventory position at a warehouse, the (Japanese) man who hired me said, after I aced a math prerequisite exam, "Of course you passed it! I made the decision to hire you the moment I saw you. I could spot your f---ing slanted eyes from a mile away!" The comment made me uncomfortable at the time, but I did get the job and thought not at all about it afterward. Because I am half European mix n' match (Swedish, English, and others, I guess), not everyone can tell. But when I give an indication that I am proficient at math - formerly a math major, currently a math minor - people laugh and attribute it to my race. What disturbs me is that I have certainly come to accept and even catered to this perception that my race and interests are linked, in this instance. More disturbingly, this article indicates that while black and white racial tensions have always been part of social discourse, there is little or none regarding the status of Asians or Asian Americans. As a "model minority," we expect them to be the same - to work hard, to be good at math or science, and to be, at best non-descript, and at worst, bumbling with a heavy accent. That Asians and Asian Americans are the recipients of racial stereotyping is not surprising in a country that is rife with conflict, whether it's racial, gendered, or otherwise. What is problematic is that this stereotyping is not studied or critiqued; it has been normalized. Until this article, I had never considered the serious implications of the stereotyping of Asians and Asian Americans within society. At least, with African Americans (given the white-black dichotomy we bandy about), the conflict is public and has a place for discussion. Asian and Asian American stereotyping is generally invisible and even acceptable. It begs the question, how many more groups are targeted and treated as such, with little or no recognition of the offense? And what will it take for American society to perceive these shortcomings of its purported equality? The O.J. Simpson trial was over ten years ago, and little to no attention was paid to the racializing of Asians and Asian Americans. This leaves little encouragement that recognition and representation will effectively call out the conflict, and until then, the problem will go unnoticed by many, lamented by few, and changed not at all.

Response to Hunt.

I have always been troubled by people who claim O.J. (and other people of color) "played the race card." Whether or not this particular case had an outcome predicated on race, people of color, especially African-Americans, are overrepresented in prisons. In his concluding remarks, Hunt states that everyone knows the criminal justice system has "disproportionately incarcerated deserving black-raced males" (417) (emphasis added). The use of "deserving" here is troubling, because the criminal justice system is heavily flawed and, as a part of a society that is not color-blind (no matter how much it claims to be), that system is also not unbiased. Hunt claims that white-raced people need to believe in O.J.'s guilt, and thus, the color-blindness of the system. It would surely be unfortunate for people to have to re-examine the raced partiality of the criminal and legal systems, as well as the larger social context of racial hierarchy. To do these things would mean relinquishing the top of the totem pole, as well as the ability to say that people of color are in a lower position (economically, politically, etc.) from their own laziness/uselessness/lethargy, rather than admitting some responsibility. In short, whites were hoping that O.J. Simpson would be proven guilty so they could be affirmed in their beliefs about blacks and how the system is fair for all. Luckily for them, despite Simpson's acquittal, the legal system hasn't changed, nor have the clearly biased structures in place.

Response to Alderman.

For me, this article reminded me of what happened after 9/11. During the whole united-we-stand, patriotic messages, very little attention was paid to the persons responsible, except that it might be a terrorist group. When it came out that it was Al Qaeda, we then found out that people connected to the group had been allowed to take planes in and out of the U.S. following 9/11. There was such a focus on America and its survivors that we might have lost the potential for justice. While the intentions of news outlets may have been to unite the country, they failed to ask the questions and pursue the stories that might have solved important problems. When we lose the greater perspective of world events, or national events, we lose the integrity of the media and even our country as well.

Did No-Fault Divorce Legislation Matter? Definitely Yes and Sometimes No

The Rodgers, et al. article is a response to Glenn’s critique of a previous study. Firstly, they contest Glenn’s use of linear curve for Figure 1. The use of the linear curve indicates that the Rodgers, et al. exaggerated their numbers; however, the authors used the linear-plus-quadratic curve because they felt that the increasing rate of divorces would be better explained. Though they claim that they could resolve this issue by “let[ting] the data speak” (which is used a few times in the article), the authors did a series of state-by-state graphs to show the patterns of divorce prior to and following the implementation of no-fault divorce laws in each state. The rest of the article continues in this vein, rebutting Glenn’s charges on their research project design, and arguing that 2 percent difference can be quite an impact on divorce rates nationwide. They conclude by sticking with their initial findings – that no-fault divorce laws affected the divorce rates in the U.S. – and posing more questions for further study.

My first thought when reading this article was, This is some catty shit. Seriously. The fact that Glenn responded to the article, then the authors drummed a response to his critique – it seems unnecessary. Both parties respond in order to further their agenda and to appear more knowledgeable and legitimate in their claims. But the effect is that all authors involved are petty, arguing over these semantics. Rather than writing articles back and forth, to assert one’s authority and knowledge, the feuding parties should team up and conduct a study together. At least then the energy being put into these articles would go toward a common goal and could help understand how/if no-fault divorce affects divorce. Personally, I believe that if people want to get divorced, they should be able to. If making divorce easier to obtain enables people to divorce, then more power to them. Would we prefer people to stay married because they cannot afford divorce or some other impediments? Having half of American marriages end in divorce might be embarrassing to some people and could be seen as reflecting the impulsiveness of Americans and the triviality with which they treat marriage. But I think it shows that people are determined to be happy, and in order to do so, they aren’t afraid to get married, divorce, marry again, and divorce, until they find the right person. The pursuit of happiness is a funny thing, and people go about it in many ways. And I think no-fault divorce is another nod to that American sentiment.

A Reconsideration of the Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Divorce Rates

The Glenn article is a critique of a previous study done by Nakonezny, Shull, and Rodgers study, which attributed the spike in divorce rates to the change to no-fault divorce laws. Reflecting back the figures from the other article, Glenn argues that there is no strong causal relationship between the two. Because the divorce boom happened at roughly the same time, despite no-fault divorce laws going into effect at different times for all states, indicating that other variables may have been involved in the increase. Glenn believes that the no-fault divorce laws came into effect after what is referred to as the “deinstitutionalization of marriage” happened in the United States. He concludes that the law reflects of the values of a society and that limiting access to no-fault divorce would be indicative of Americans’ views on marriage and divorce.

This article is interesting because it reminds me of the arguments about same-sex marriage. People say that granting same-sex couples this right would cheapen the institution of marriage; however, half of the marriages in the United States end in divorce. On one hand, there are people who want to retain the sanctity of their marriages, while, on the other hand, we have a group who is fighting for the privilege. If anything, giving same-sex couples the right to marry would probably lower the divorce rate, because heterosexuals seem to take marriage with a grain of salt – and that, according to Glenn, cannot be blamed on no-fault divorce. Further, I have a hard time calling marriage sacred when Britney Spears had one and annulled it two days later. There’s a great deal of blame to be spread around for the deinstitutionalization of marriage, but I doubt the fault lies with new laws and homosexuals. Surely they couldn’t do any worse than their heterosexual counterparts with marriage. We will see.

The Locker Room and the Dorm Room: Workplace Norms and the Boundaries of Sexual Harassment in Magazine Editing

In the Dellinger and Williams article, the research focuses on two magazine publishers, Gentleman’s Sophisticate and Womyn. In the former, the workplace is highly sexualized because the material itself is sexual. People see the sexual atmosphere as part of their jobs, though it could be construed as sexual harassment. The idea is that people are supposed to know what they are getting into when they join the magazine, and if they cannot handle the sexually charged atmosphere, they should leave. People in GS use humor to cope, usually revolving around the content in the magazines. When sexual innuendo and behavior crosses into personal spheres, however, employees believe harassment has occurred. The authors emphasize that sexual harassment is seen here as an individual problem, not an organizational issue. In contrast, Womyn magazine’s employees feel that talking about sexual content is part of the atmosphere. People talk about their personal lives, and because this is tolerated, the lines between what is acceptable and unacceptable are blurred. The employees at Womyn seemed think themselves immune to sexual harassment because they claimed to share a common belief in what sexual harassment is, and without men, they didn’t seem to think it was a possibility. In either context, GS or Womyn, however, sexual harassment was present, albeit in potentially different forms and with different solutions as to solving them.

What struck me about this article was the employees at Womyn. The presumed shared belief in what sexual harassment, as well as the idea that all women (especially the educated, self-proclaimed feminists who work at the magazine) would rise above it, is naïve. Women are capable of harassing others, even learned ones. To blame sexual harassment entirely on men is just ignorant. The highly sexualized nature of either workplace environment is the key culprit in the system of sexual harassment; the lack of discernible boundaries at Womyn, however, seems a greater risk for such behaviors in the workplace. With an assumed belief of what sexual harassment is, coworkers feel free to share sexual ideas, not questioning whether or not the inclusion of this material is offensive to some, never mind all.

Boundary Lines: Labeling Sexual Harassment in Restaurants

The Giuffre and Williams article focused on sexual harassment, as experienced by waiting staff in restaurants. Most respondents in the study believed their workplace to be sexually charged – rife with innuendo, touching, and other sexual behaviors – but seemed to dismiss the acts as an ingrained aspect of the food business. When sexual harassment was brought up, it was because one of three conditions: (1) the accused is a person in power; (2) the accused is of a different race or ethnicity from the accuser; or, (3) the accused is of a different sexual orientation than the accuser. Even if the acts are identical to interactions between fellow wait staff, people become uncomfortable with this familiarity with persons in power because they have no friendly relationship with the accused and believe that the manager/boss has overstepped into the accuser’s personal sphere, physically or otherwise. Similarly, people of dissimilar race or ethnicity were involved in sexual harassment, because the accusers felt no closeness or familiarity with the accused. One respondent explains, “This is not somebody that I talk to on a friendly basis… [W]hen he touches me, all I know is he is just touching me and there is no context about it. With other people, if they said something or they touched me, it would be funny or… we have a relationship. This person and I and all the other people do not. So that is sexual harassment” (Giuffre, Williams, p. 389). Lastly, people of different sexual orientations (from the accuser, that is) are named in sexual harassment. In this study, three heterosexual males indicated that they felt harassed by same-sex males, who had perpetrated the same behaviors as the rest of the wait staff. The key to this discussion is that while the harassing behaviors are considered typical among wait staff and familiars in the workplace, people outside of this sphere who engage in these behaviors are not tolerated for the same sexual behaviors.

I related very closely to this article, having worked at a movie theater for many years. Working among sixteen to twenty-four year olds, there was seldom a conversation that wasn’t about sex. Talking about sex was a universal language in which everyone could participate. Those who didn’t were simply not a part of the group, and sexual overtures – ass-grabbing, lewd comments – were generally seen as normal. Given the age range, however, “simulated” homosexuality or bisexuality was permitted and even encouraged among women, while man-to-man interactions were still seen as harassing.

The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges

The Spohn article discussed the differences in sentencing between black and white judges in the United States. In the article, which surveyed offenders charged with felony crimes, Spohn found that black judges were less likely than white judges to incarcerate offenders; however, there seemed to be no discernible difference in the length of prison sentences handed down. Further, black judges were less likely than white judges to sentence black male offenders to prison; there was no distinct change on sentence for black females. The study also found that while black and white judges sent black offenders to prison fairly equally, both races incarcerate blacks more than they do whites. This information indicates that there is little disparity in the sentencing decisions of black and white judges. Spohn explains that this could be due to other factors. Rather than determined by race, social class may be involved. Most people who rise to become judges hail from the middle- to upper-class. They also typically complete a law education, which further homogenizes those who attain judge status. Race is not the only factor by which people differentiate within society. Because the disproportionate amount of blacks in the prison cannot be attributed solely to the discrimination from white judges, it appears that these other factors (class, status, privilege) may be at work.

The article itself was interesting because its findings did not surprise me; however, the context and literature cited within, as well as the assumptions targeted with this study, did. Do people expect that race is the great be-all, end-all of society? Though race can be an immediate, visceral differentiation of people’s differences, it is ignorant to think that this might solely explain why black males are receiving harsher punishment than other peoples in America. Other factors like class have shown time and again to make a difference; furthermore, in today’s society, it is naïve and limited in scope to think that such problems might be so simple to understand. This article serves to blow those notions aside but also indicates that many people out there believe that there is only one problem, when it has clearly become a tangled and complicated mess. It will take more than a specialization in race relations to comprehend the troubles; rather, it may take the entire sociological imagination and scope to discern the circumstances to which many groups – not just black males – experience inequality.

Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?

The Ellsworth article discusses the process through which juries deliberate trials. It begins with comparing judges to juries. While juries are typically a dozen people of varied backgrounds and experiences, a judge is usually better educated, especially in law, and has experience in the legal system. Nonetheless, citizens are made jurors and given the right to make these decisions because it is believed that they harbor the interests of the community. Also, it is believed that, through the deliberation process, a refined version of “the truth” will emerge and that the jurors will converge upon the verdict that will impart the most justice. To that end, the article discusses the gravity with which the task was taken but also shows a lack of knowledge of – and guidance within – the legal system, including definitions of the charges against defendants. This article does not articulate that jurors are incapable of granting just verdicts; rather, they do not have the “educational criteria” to make completely informed decisions (Ellsworth 224).

The article actually warmed me a bit. Because many past articles imparted the belief that many American citizens hold little weight or faith in the legal system, I thought that juries might not accept the gravity of making these decisions. Evidently, I was wrong. Despite not having specially knowledge or experience, it is clear that juries wish to truly see justice done and care about the aspects of the case – especially motive, an ever-important factor. Perhaps in believing that the system is flawed or broken, jurors act to take it upon themselves to see justice done to their fellow citizens.

The Role of the Jury in the Killing State

Sarat and Austin’s article investigated the role of juries in capital punishment cases. Jurors are given the decision because they are supposed to represent the interests of the community, as well as the intentions and beliefs of the common individual. The state delegates this power to jurors and therefore gives them the ability to give order of death. Jurors justify choosing the death penalty for many reasons. In the Connors case, the prosecution showed pictures of the murder victim and had the jurors pass around the murder weapon. This made the violence blatantly real for the jurors; the evidence presented made Connors seem like a monster, able as he was to perpetrate such violence. They were not amenable to the defending counsel’s argument that his circumstances – especially the alcohol and drugs he’d imbibed, not to mention his precarious home life – altered his choices and perceptions, leading him to killing the victim. The jurors could not identify with the defendant and were unable to sympathize with his plight; in contrast, they feared for Connors’ release and the additional lives he might end if he was ever released from prison. This, coupled with the idea that a life sentence could mean getting out in ten years, whereas a death sentence may mean life in prison, is why the jurors passed the judgment that Connors be executed. The article rounds out the misperceptions of the legal system, as well as the moral obligations felt by the jurors, and the subsequent sentencing.

I was particularly interested in the focus on violence in the article. In it, Sarat and Austin write, “While the prosecution makes great efforts to persuade jurors that such violence is unnecessary, irrational, indiscriminate, gruesome, and useless, the violence of the death penalty is described… as rational, purposive, and controlled through values, norms, and procedures external to violence itself” (155). Also, the jury believed that they were one device of many that would see Connors to his execution, if that day came, because he would be able to appeal the decision, and if he was denied, the jurors were not the only people to condemn him; they were merely a cog in the machine. This belief, coupled with the description of violence (Connors’ murdering a man versus the state’s execution of Connors), reminded me of Nazi Germany. It has been said that the soldiers were able to exterminate so many people was because each had a sole function – one group loaded people onto trains. Another group herded them to the gas chambers. Another turned the knob that released the gases. No individual person had the responsibility of the decision; rather, many people contributed and felt that they were only doing their jobs to a righteous end. Looking back in history, we know now how horrific those events were. I wonder if someday we’ll back on these executions and feel the same way.

Cultural Differences and Discrimination: Samoans Before a Public Housing Eviction Board

Lempert and Monsma’s article “Cultural Differences and Discrimination: Samoans Before a Public Housing Eviction Board” investigates whether or not Samoans experience cultural discrimination from the Hawaii Housing Authority’s (HHA) eviction board. The authors employ several quantitative models, with mixed results. Rather than simply stating that being Samoan makes one more likely to be evicted, the authors delve deeper and seek qualitative evidence. They interview some of the board members of the HHA, as well as prosecutors and project managers. What they found was that Samoan culture dictated that a “good Samoan” sends money home to the family when there is a wedding or funeral (as well as other reasons); this leaves some Samoans with little money for rent, and they end up before the HHA. Unfortunately, the types of reasons that Samoans offered up for not paying rent were incongruent with those more readily accepted by the HHA, due to cultural differences. Many board members expressed empathy with their plight and circumstances but claimed to treat the Samoans as equal to others. Excuses offered that were more acceptable to the board included illness, medical expenses, burglary/robbery, and other sudden turns of fortune. One case was presented in which an individual claimed that a male had lost his finger, but her insurance could not cover the bills, as he was not her son; so she paid the bill in cash. Then, when she had the cash, it was stolen from her locker at work, leaving her unable to pay her bills, including her rent. The board seemed to accept this excuse, because it sounds like the individual did everything in her power to provide for her personal responsibilities and expenses. The Samoan culture, however, has a different idea of personal responsibilities and expenses, and considers obligations that are outside of our cultural frame of reference. The authors ask, “Does this privileging of culturally familiar excuses over culturally unfamiliar ones constitute discrimination? From a broad sociological perspective one can answer yes” (Lempert and Monsma 906). Thus, the discrimination is cultural, because it is slanted to those in the popularly accepted culture and makes no allowance for people like Samoans, who have different ideals and obligations.

What interested me in this article is the idea of personal responsibility. The authors talk about Samoans’ excuses and claim, “To Westerners, these kinds of expenditures seem to be within a person’s control; but to Samoans they may seem every bit as compelling as the need to pay doctors’ bills” (Lempert and Monsma 901). The cultural idea behind personal responsibility – and to whom one has obligations – is a unique idea, simply because I have seldom, if ever, read about it. It is intriguing to think that one might be penalized for feeling accountability for one’s family. In the article, the woman who paid for her son’s medical bills was accepted in her excuse; however, the Samoans’ familial obligations appear to go above and beyond the call of duty, to Americans. It is perhaps due to the nature of the Samoans’ reasons – funerals, weddings, or traveling back to Samoa when needed. One’s perceived priorities, then, are judged and weighted against the cultural norm. I understand that the system is in place to be fair to all, but when we call America the great melting pot and expect people to quickly assimilate to our cultural ideals, it seems hypocritical to welcome them conditionally. Rather than looking to our laws and seeing how they might better suit many cultures – as in the case of the HHA eviction board – we stick by our ideals and never question how they might be adapted to suit more needs. I don’t have any answers here, only questions and criticisms (surprise, surprise), but I find myself irked that the U.S. is supposed to be a place where people come for refuge but, culturally, there is little to be found.

Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances

May and Stengel’s article “Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances” describes a study of people who were dissatisfied in their medical treatment and the variables that may have led to their choice in dispute resolution. There are four options for the patients – lumping it (letting the issue go), exiting (leaving the doctor’s care), claiming (going to the doctor with the problem), or seeking a lawyer (looking to legal counsel and possibly taking legal action). The authors list variables – audiences, parties, seriousness of injury, and general resources – to see how they influence people who engage in each of the four choices. May and Stengel emerge with several patterns related to lawyer-seekers, or suers: they solicit advice from friends, including lawyer friends, on their potential case; they believe they have a serious medical injury; they do not have much knowledge in the health care world; they have fewer resources (money, class, power). The article concludes that while these findings tell us about the circumstances of the people who sue medical practitioners, the study could be taken further, to look for variables that are linked to lawsuits that do or do not come to fruition.

What intrigued me in this article was what it did not say. While the authors find many points about suers and draw a vague picture in their conclusion, I found some of the other patterns to be interesting. Maybe they seem intuitive, but I thought they deserved mention. For one, lumpers (or, as the article calls them, lumpits) had the most litigation experience. The authors make note of it and feel that this might be due to disillusionment with the system, such as its timeliness and effectiveness (or lack thereof). Lumpers also had the least knowledge of the health care world but the highest education level. This suggests that these people lump it because they do not know the rights they have legally, within the health care system. While it is tempting to suggest that their level of education contributes to their disenchantment with the system, the Ewick and Sibley piece, as well as articles on naming, blaming, and claiming, indicates that people of various education and socioeconomic levels are discontented with the law. Rather, because lumpers have a higher level of education, their lack of health care knowledge might make them hesitate before seeking lawyers, since they may be learned but not in this area. Additionally, because of their level of education, they may be of higher socioeconomic status and do not want to be associated with the people who do sue their doctors. After all, May and Stengel found that lawyer-seekers tend to have fewer resources – money, class, and power – and lumpers may not want to deal with this label, nor the money-hungry shamelessness commonly associated with those who sue.

Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an American Urban Neighborhood

Merry’s article “Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an American Urban Neighborhood” described the use of the court, the police, and other methods of handling issues among an urban housing project. The author begins by outlining the races of the population of the project, as well as their education and social class. Her analysis of the way people in the neighborhood handled disputes indicated that people with power were likely to resort to violence, especially in crime-initiated disputes and interpersonal conflicts; likewise, people with less physical strength and experience in violence were more likely to consult the police. Of the dispute processing moves, eleven females used the court and none employed violence, while four males used the court and seventeen employed violence. Merry also explored across racial lines, finding that blacks were as likely to use the courts as they were violence, while whites were three times as likely to use the courts than they were to use violence; the Chinese population, however, did not consult the courts and resorted to violence in four instances. In experience with the law, of those with criminal records, seven resorted to violence, while none used the courts. This is explained further when Merry suggests that one’s prior criminal offenses hurt their credibility in court, often resulting in skepticism of innocence and, subsequently, harsh punishments. Merry also indicates that formal controls (court, police), as opposed to informal controls (gossip, avoidance) were less likely used by people with potential long-term investment in the community, the relationships in question, and a combination of the two. In particular, the Chinese population in the neighborhood did not seek the power of the court, as they had ties to the community, sometimes completely dependent on the English-speaking Chinese, and were unwilling to risk losing the support.

What struck me in this article was the way that violence played a role in the neighborhood. For one, it was a method to “settle” a dispute (often resulting in one party moving away, unwillingly or not). But, in the case of Renee and George, in which he publicly struck her after she left him, the violence played a different role. The author intimated that though violence had characterized their relationship in the past, George’s insult led to legal action because, as the two were no longer seeing each other, “he no longer had the same rights to hit her” (Merry 909). Also, that he committed this offense in public was another reason for Renee’s chagrin. To me, violence is a way of gaining respect in this community. It is a method through which disputes can be settled – through fear and intimidation – and in an urban community, this surprises few people. Though the courts can be powerful, they are clearly unproductive in settling disputes in the neighborhood in the study. The main power that is recognized, then, is violence. In this case, George’s violence against Renee resulted in greater violence directed at his person, which led to his exodus from the project. Public violence against another can gain respect, but it can also guarantee danger to one’s person. It seems an ineffective and foolish way to settle disputes, because there is always someone bigger, with more friends and/or weapons; all that is needed, of course, is for a powerful ally to align with the powerless. The cowboy-like, vigilante justice system in the community is reckless, volatile, and indicates that the courts have far less impact on the neighborhood – short of blaming, shaming, and intimidation – than can be hoped. Given the failure of the courts to attribute sufficient weight to the cases brought before them, as well as a slant against those with previous criminal records, it is not certain that further legal action would prove productive in managing disputes in this neighborhood.

O'Barr's Lay Expectations

O'Barr's article Lay Expectations of the Civil Justice System interviewed nineteen plaintiffs in litigation cases processed in Denver during the summer of 1986, about their experience with and satisfaction derived from their dealings with the small claims court. The first plaintiff interviewed is Edward Atkin, whose motorcycle was damaged by a drunk woman and to whom was only paid part of the cost of repair for the bike. During his interview, Atkin had prepared his testimony or that of his witnesses; he seemed confident that the truth would see him through. Another case involved Mr. and Mrs. Winner, a couple who loaned $390 to old friends, who then defaulted on the loan. Though the Winners, uh, won their case and were awarded $400, the couple seemed dissatisfied with the system because they had hoped for some greater punishment to their old friends and were apparently unhappy that the small claims court could not inflict the kind of punishment (public humiliation and perhaps a greater monetary reward) that they expected. In the last case presented, James Parker is a man who owed his landlord $35 and was prompted tossed out, with his possessions seized. After two weeks of living on the street, he set in motion a suit against the landlord. When he was interviewed, Parker was unsure about the procedures of the case but seemed unconcerned about his case, or his landlord’s own case; like Atkin, he maintained certainty that the facts would come to light, and that he would be proved right. A theme in these stories is that people attributed greater power to the court than it actually possesses; also, plaintiffs seemed ignorant of the adversarial nature of the system, and did not anticipate any strong or convincing argument from their defendants. Rather, they believed that the truth would come out and that the plaintiffs would prevail.

What interests me is that both themes speak of a deep trust of the law and equating it to truth. Despite their litigious suits, these plaintiffs are not “with the law,” because they believe in the rightness of it and consider it more seriously than one attributes to a game. They are probably “before the law,” because they seem engaged in the idea of truth and justice – and they believe that the law will bring them that. Whether they got this message from the ever-popular (and cited by interviewees in the article) People’s Court television show, or have learned to trust the legal system, it is clear that the plaintiffs expect justice, and they equate that with the truth. Unfortunately, further dealings with the legal system may not always yield such optimism – or so we’ve read.

Macaulay's Law in Everyday Life

Macaulay's article Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sports investigates three arenas in which people learn about law. In school, students read about textbooks ambiguous in their content, spouting legal jargon (the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative branches) while using euphemisms to illustrate some of America’s less than lawful and what some would consider immoral actions since its inception, including (but not limited to) the eviction of Native Americans, several hundred years of slavery, Japanese internment during World War II, and other slights. Macaulay shows the contradictory nature of school in teaching law, because it tells what the law is and how America has negotiated breaking it. Entertainment talks of the media and its effect on people’s ideas of law. This includes cop and lawyer shows. The shows talk about law as a tool for justice, but often, lawyers make deals or even defend guilty clients, indicating that the law is bendable to those who know how. Here is another contradictory media outlet for people on what law is. Lastly, Macaulay cites sports. That is, there are rules in sports that are made to ensure a fair game is played. How many times, though, has a sports fan complained that his/her favorite team lost because the referee made a bad call (which is blamed on the referee’s corruption or apparent “blindness,” according to the distraught fan)? The rules are in place to ensure the game is played properly, but when people make the calls that win or lose games, spectators may not care about the rules, as long as their team gets the win. It’s important to note that, as in the other two subjects, sports are described as an arena in which rules are valued but are also seen as bendable or breakable, if they can elicit a preferred outcome.

This article made me think about what people actually value in American society. In Ewick and Sibley, people in the “with the law” category saw the law as a game to be played, in order to beget a desired outcome. While the respondents who were listed with this label seemed not to have too much power in ensuring a favorable outcome, it seems that the three categories above are making believers of Americans and creating more people who are “with the law.” After all, football is a game that people play, and if your team wins because of what might be deemed a bad call, who cares? Your team still won. It’s interesting to note that people who seem to believe in the law don’t care too much about rules and regulations, as long as it suits their needs. Certainly the Macaulay article made me think as such, and I cannot form a good argument for why this is not so. In fact, it seems pretty eerily accurate.

Nielsen's article on "Ordinary" Citizens, Street Harassment

Nielsen's article Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment is a study conducted on 100 people in the California area about their experience with street harassment – sexually-suggestive comments, race-related comments, begging – and their beliefs regarding the law, including if it should involve itself in the practice. The author explains four reasons that respondents give for not believing that the law should limit street harassment: the First Amendment, autonomy, impracticality, and distrust of authority. The First Amendment means that people believe that freedom of speech includes harassment and that they are not willing to give up this freedom in order to avoid the harassment. Autonomy means that people – especially women – want equality and believe that involving the law with this issue means admitting that they are not equipped to deal with it. Rather, this is considered a personal issue to some respondents, and they feel that individuals should handle it, rather than involving the law. Impracticality means that the interviewees do not think it would be possible or rational to punish every single person who commits street harassment for their misdeed; in fact, many in our class who blogged last week talked about how the legal processes took enough time already, so adding this issue might further slow down the system. Lastly, some respondents admitted to distrusting the authority, or cynicism about the law in general. This means that it is believed that invoking the law will either cannot really help, or it will end up causing more damage to the person it intended to help.

This article interested me because the numbers were fascinating. From a racial standpoint, 4 percent of whites named distrust of authority as their reason for opposing legal regulation of offensive speech, compared to 28 percent of people of color. 80 percent of white men listed the First Amendment for their primary reason for opposing legal regulation, while 56 percent of African-American men named distrust of authority. While Nielsen indicates that there are racial, gender, and class lines that affect people’s experiences and opinions of street harassment, the numbers only further whet my appetite. Is this distrust of authority simply based on race, one’s experience with street harassment, or the combination? 28 percent of women listed autonomy as their primary reason for opposing regulation, compared to 3 percent of men. Again, it becomes obvious that gender plays a role in people’s experiences with and opinions on street harassment. I think it would be interesting to test, if possible, if race or gender is more an indicator of people’s experiences with and opinions on street harassment. The study overall opened a lot of spaces in my mind about gender and race, as well as what people will accept, due to the inequalities they likely experience within society, and how they deal with it.

Ewick and Sibley.

One purpose of the book was to explain the difference in perspectives that people have about the law. The first – “before the law” – is that the law is a grand system that is more or less distant from the lives of regular people. The second – “with the law” – is that the law is actually a game to be played and maneuvered for one’s benefit, or to one’s detriment. The third point of view – “against the law” – is that the law is a source of power that people are either use to further their interests, or find themselves helpless in the face of. The authors compare these perspectives in order to analyze the relationships that “ordinary” people experience with the law.

One point of interest for this writer was the helplessness and impotence felt by many in the face of the legal system, expressed in this book. Is it learned, then, that people have no power and thus must accept the judgments and slights dealt out by the law? Or, through their own inequality within society (many were described as poor or of minority status), do people come to feel incapable of successfully navigating the system? Does having money, power, or racial/class status procure one’s legal victory, or is everyone being subjected to the same rules? In Millie Simpson’s case, she was not given a public defender until after her judgment had been dealt; this was the only instance that I recall of this sort in the book. Would this have happened to an educated person? A white person? A person of greater economic class? Or would the court have recognized the inadvisability of trying to withhold rights from someone who either knows better or has the power to object to such treatment?

Another point of interest was the fact that this study took place in New Jersey. How much would the results differ in, say, Texas? Would people feel a greater affinity to or disdain for the legal system? Would those interviewed have had greater success steering through legal waters? Furthermore, what is the greatest determinant of legal injustice or mistreatment – class, race, age, sex? Many of those interviewed were above the age of thirty; would the younger generation have reacted differently, recounted stories with varying ideas than those presented in this book?

Gender, Race, Social Class, and the Law.

The Grana, et al., article discusses the social variables of gender, race, and social class, in regard to the law. Specifically, examples of laws enacted due to these variables are described. Women’s rights in regard to paid labor, property, sexual harassment, and rape have changed over time, due to historical and social context; the authors point out that the implications of old laws (coverture, defined as a husband owning his wife) resonate even today. There are many examples of racial inequality within the law. For hundreds of years, African-Americans and Native Americans were denied the rights of white citizens (slavery, the Trail of Tears). Unfortunately, the article ends abruptly before delving too deeply into social class, though the Gideon v. Wainwright Supreme Court Case (1963) has some element of social inequality, given that the man on trial was African-American and also poor; he was unable to afford a lawyer and was told that the court would not provide one. Though undoubtedly his race had something to do with being denied counsel by the court, the fact that the man was notably poor and had four prior felonies likely contributed to his denial of rights.

The most illuminating aspect of the article is that these facts are known and not surprising. Despite the changes enacted in law over the last few hundred years, there is still a discernibly disproportionate number of African-Americans in prison, and laws on rape are still very narrow and can be extremely difficult to prove in a court of law, even if a confession and material evidence are present. Despite the assertion that all are created equal in the eyes of our forefathers, it is apparent that inequalities based on race, class, and gender prevail – even in the legal system – which indicates that oppression is alive and well in America. And, despite the changing of laws and outcries for justice, the inaction in regards to the inequality shows that Americans either do not know or do not care about the existence of such in the legal system.

Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research

In Silbey and Sarat’s article, the authors argue that it is possible to be both empirical and critical when conducting and analyzing social research. They discuss the roots of the law and society movement as “an effort not to be deceived;” it served to seek the truth and prevent clinging to any universal belief merely out of tradition. They found that a critical analysis does not exclude the movement from adopting traditions rather than continuing to dig further, and what began as an investigative expedition became what it set out to avoid – the authors write, “[T]he critical bite that comes from challenging a dominant paradigm often gets lost when the new vision becomes accepted and taken for granted, and is no longer at the margins but now functions as its own center” (p. 166). The authors wish for the movement must jettison its complacency, and reclaim its critical edge. To that end, they explain that law and society is constantly changing; in fact, to many people, it can have varied meanings. The law is viewed as the system that sends someone to prison or sentences another to execution; to others, it may be a way to right injustices, and to recompense victims. In order to fully understand law and society, it must be understood that life circumstances create different perspectives among individuals and that it is impossible to know how social life shapes the law, and vice versa. In knowing this, it becomes clear that universal truths cannot be made on law and society, as they are entities constantly changing, in their definitions and interactions.

One particular passage in the conclusion caught my attention. The authors write, “We need to stop trying quite so hard to come to terms with that ineffectiveness and to start studying what legal life is like in the vast interstices of law” (p. 173). This tells the reader that instead of complaining about the failures of the system and attempting to determine what went wrong, it will be more productive and realistic to study the law itself and how it pertains to the people, as interpreted by them, and their use of it in the practical world. This belief smacks of optimism, something seldom seen (and even more seldom published!) in the sociological realm. If these authors believe the solution lies in adopting more practical methods and focus, it seems reminiscent of the original purpose of the law and society movement, which – by the sound of it – could use the interest and rejuvenation.

Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture

In Yngvesson's article, she discusses the interaction of legal culture and popular culture - that is, how local law can reflect the ideologies of a community. Yngvesson's point of view is that "'the spirit of law’... is transformed, challenged, and reinvented local practices that produce a plural legal culture in contemporary America" (p. 1693). Though the larger body of government enacts national laws, they can be interpreted and utilized as citizens within smaller cities and states see fit. As people of higher authority – magistrates, judges, and other figures – head up local courts, these individuals use the law to reflect the values of the people and are responsible for keeping communities’ interests at heart. Courts are seen as enforcers of moral issues, as well as a forum for people to put forth their agendas.

What interested me was the discussion of the definitions of “neighborhood” and “community” (p. 1707). The black complainants insisted that the defendant could not understand their feelings, having not endured their struggles and history. Is it expected that people will be able to understand the contexts of their neighbors, and thus, their feelings? Was the defendant irresponsible in not having lived the same experiences as his neighbors and thus not sharing the same focus on what they wanted from their community? Because of the difference in circumstance and lives, it is hard to imagine all people being understanding and solicitous of the feelings of their neighbors. Was the defendant’s behavior objectionable, simply because he ran a business, or was it his difference in circumstance and life experience – race – that offended the black complainants? Do all communities with mixed race and/or class have tensions regarding values of the neighborhood? In my experience, neighborhoods adhere to the same standards and are close-knit, or they have little to no interaction as a whole. Does the difference in circumstance among neighborhoods lead to the latter?